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1. Two ontological ways of representing the world. 
 
   As a theoretical economist and a social scientist with wide philosophical 
interests, I welcome the opportunity to speak about such an interesting and 
unusual subject. In my opinion, humanism and religion are two different 
approaches to the search for truth. Two ontological representations of the 
relationships between human beings, nature and society. As such, they have 
largely influenced the recent historical development of economic thought 
and the ethical valuation of economic systems.  
   One of them, humanism, is a philosophy of life which acknowledges the 
human essence of man (that of animal rationale and homo humanus), 
assigns man a priority, takes him as a measure of all things and in its non-
religious versions considers Nature as the material generative principle1. 
For the other one, religion, a superior spiritual entity, God, takes the place 
of Nature as world creator and the common faith of human beings performs 
the positive function of a social intermediary.  
   Both these conceptions afford the problem of the relations between 
human beings, as individual persons, and the surrounding world – relations 
involving nature, civil society and transcendence. And both of them have 
been praised and contested. From Nietzsche‟s times onward there have 
been many inconclusive debates on the alleged „death of man‟ (the 
dissolution of humanism) and the alleged „death of God‟ (the end of 
religion, conceived as an illusory escape from reality).  
   Scholars interested in hermeneutical ontology and the philosophy of 
language and social communication – from Nietzsche to Heidegger, from 
Gadamer and Habermas to Rorty – have analyzed from different points of 
view the possible impact on the search for objective knowledge of reason 
                                                     
   
1
 As such, humanism should be distinguished from humanitarianism, a different term 
which implies humanitarian actions to relieve human suffering. 
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and faith, consciousness and unconsciousness, nature and grace. On the 
controversial problem of the relation of men with truth they have come to 
different conclusions.  
   Humanism and religion are not incompatible. They can be regarded as 
two mutually consistent approaches, two „philosophies of good-will‟ which 
offer distinct but convergent solutions to the lack of credible values that 
characterizes a capitalistic society, where human beings are reduced to 
labour power and are only worth their capacity to work and produce wealth.  
   I shall consider humanism a theoretical position with the following 
distinctive features: 
i) a non-fundamentalist epistemic attitude that would replace the human 
factor (labour) at the centre of the economic discourse, would not 
recognize scarcity as the central hermeneutical category of human 
existence and would not obey a universal principle of rationality and 
efficiency by which human beings would count only for their 
productive capacity;  
ii) a revaluation of use value with respect to exchange value and a 
consequent refusal to conceive production as exclusively oriented to 
the market; 
iii) a dislike for any kind of economic determinism, including faith in 
economic laws and dialectical materialism. 
   Humanism in economics entails a positive anthropocentric attitude to life 
and work and an appeal to social justice. Humanism takes human beings 
and their social relations in consideration. 
   It follows that humanism is not compatible with the pursuit of particular 
vested interests. There cannot be a humanist or compassionate kind of 
capitalism, based on corporate social responsibility and not motivated by 
greed. That is a non fundamentalist, ethical type of capitalism, where 
values and profits are happily merged. A way of getting profit decently, 
without exploiting people, either physically (through surplus labour) or 
psychically (with alienation), is pure nonsense. 
   For the sake of completeness and to allow for a comparison, we shall 
refer also to some post-modern anti-humanist theories of knowledge who 
assert the priority of the material structure over man and society (such as 
Louis Althusser‟s “aleatory materialism”) and to other post-structural non-
humanist gnoseological conceptions of French origin, such as Michel 
Foucault‟s “microanalysis of social structure”, Jean-François Lyotard‟s 
“libidinal economics” and Jean Baudrillard‟s “political economy of sign 
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and symbolic values”2. All of them regard truth as correspondence to 
reality, rather than as a purely semantic linguistic notion, or as a revelation 
by a transcendent entity.  
   Economic activity has much to do with the psychical mechanisms which 
regulate the projection and repression of human impulses. There is a phase 
in human life in which primitive, unconscious processes are substituted by 
more organized and unified conscious ones. It is in that phase that 
economic activity becomes important.  
   Psychology is recognized by many economists as a form of knowledge 
which can usefully mediate between individual and social behaviour. And 
thus provide a missing link between the economic structure and the super-
structural sphere.   
   Humanists reject the idea of a merely technical nature of economic 
science. They regard economics as a critical subject concerned with the 
reasons of human actions and with the ends to be pursued. Whereas many 
non-humanist authors consider economics a purely instrumental branch of 
learning, one which should only be concerned with the best ways to achieve 
given ends in presence of scarce means.  
 
 
2. Humanism as an alternative to theocentrism. 
  
   As a philosophical and ethical attitude and an anti-authoritarian way of 
thinking reality and history, humanism trusts reason and progress and pays 
have a basic solidarity propensity with other people. They refuse the 
utilitarian „logic of capital‟ and the alleged „reasons of profit‟ that induce 
people to accumulate wealth, rather than to satisfy social and relational 
needs. They are committed to answer some fundamental philosophical 
questions. Who are human beings? What is the essence of human nature? Is 
it labour? Are men responsible for what they do, or not?  
   There is a plurality of humanist approaches. We shall here recall some of 
them. Starting from the evangelical humanism of the good Samaritan and 
from a „theocentric‟ conception: a transcendent kind of humanism, based 
on faith and reason, where all humans are supposed to be God‟s children 
and are recognized equal rights of access to the natural resources of earth. 
                                                     
   2 Namely, Georges Bataille‟s conception of a general and unrestricted economy, 
Wilhelm Reich‟s “sexual economy”, Jacques Lacan‟s unconscious symbolic order 
of the discourse, Jacques Derrida‟s deconstructionism, Gilles Deleuze‟s and Félix 
Guattari‟s “schizo-analysis of desiring production” and Paul Ricoeur‟s “epistemology of 
symbol”.   
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   Religious humanism is „Christianity fulfilled‟. It must be distinguished 
from laic, or „secular‟ humanism, an anthropocentric philosophical 
conception based on reason and freedom of conscience, which regards man 
as master of his environment and God as an object of faith, not of 
knowledge. Or as a fiction of the human mind, that tends „to create its 
creator‟ as its own product.  
   It may be noticed that in the ancient Rome the word „umanitas‟ 
(humanism) meant the human essence and was opposed to „divinitas‟, to 
underline the human autonomy from divinities3. 
   There are several types of non-religious humanism. One of them is Kant‟s 
humanism, based on an ethic of duty and on a politically correct existential 
conception implying equal natural rights and universal human solidarity. 
Another one is Rousseau‟s humanism, which was directed to the coming 
back to an imaginary state of nature and to the original simplicity and 
spontaneous sociality of the primitive man, uncorrupted by the deleterious 
institution of private property.    
   Both of them should be distinguished from the positive, rationalist and 
materialist humanism of Feuerbach, which placed man at the centre of the 
world („men make history‟, „truth is religion reversed‟), contrasted the 
human being with Logos and Nature, implied the idea of labour as the 
human essence and acknowledged man‟s capacity to control the course of 
his life.  
   Furthermore, there is J.P. Sartre‟s type of humanism, which posed 
existence before essence. Sartre identified humanism with existentialism. 
His conception of humanism ultimately led to a pessimistic vision of life (a 
philosophy of crisis).  
   Let us mention also E. Fromm‟s inter-classist relational humanism, 
sensible to ideals of human solidarity and social justice, and conceived as a 
fight against human alienation undertaken to realize the natural essence of 
man. And an utopian libertarian humanism, that of a postmodern 
Kierkegaardan anarchist tendency (A. Badiou, N. Chomsky, W. Quine, P. 
Feyerabend). It is a humanism of liberty, which pursues a deconstruction of 
systemic complexity, refuses statism and State capitalism and promotes the 
improvement of humankind without relying on religious sentiments which 
impose ethical standards. 
   Then there is the variegate set of the Marxist kinds of humanism, which 
pursue the end of production for profit and advocate the establishment of 
new social relations. They are against all forms of capitalism, including 
State capitalism.  
                                                     
   3 On this point, see A. Campana, 1946. 
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   There is, first of all, the „young Marxian‟ theoretical and ethical 
humanism, a non-dogmatic philosophical conception, exclusively based on 
reason, which calls upon unity of theory and practice. It permeates most 
critical Marxist theories4.  
   Then there is the elder Marx‟s positive humanism, still evident in his 
doctrines of worker‟s alienation and commodity‟s fetishism. Marx‟s 
concept of man was that of a social being, not that of a utilitarian 
calculating man. Man‟s humanity was for him a synonymous of man‟s 
natural sociality. He had a radical and essentially ideological conception of 
humanism.  
   A controversial point concerns the alleged abandonment by the elder 
Marx of his previous philosophical humanism. Did he actually renounce in 
his mature works to a humanist perspective? Or did he rather substitute a 
„scientific‟ humanism, that of historical materialism, to the philosophical 
humanism of Feuerbach? Is socialism a scientific humanism?  
   Personally, I would not describe the younger Marxian position as pseudo-
Marxism and the elder Marxian position as true Marxism and scientific 
humanism. For both the younger and the elder Marx the human being was 
the subject of history. 
   What can be said with certainty is that in The German Ideology (1845) 
Marx undertook with Engels a strong critique of Feuerbach‟s abstract and 
idealized philosophical humanism. Together, Marx and Engels went so far 
to assert that Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner had inverted the real 
relations between man and social history and had turned the historical 
process upside-down. It was maintained that these authors had abstracted 
from the course of history by reducing the real man to the pale fetish of the 
bourgeois individual of their own times. 
                                                     
   4 The „critical Marxist‟ type of positive humanism, as distinct from the „scientific Marxist‟ 
one, refuses any form of dialectical materialism or „theory of theoretical practice‟ and 
opposes economic determinism and economic fundamentalism. Among the leading 
exponents of Marxist humanism, we may mention Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Raya Dunayevskaya, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Adam 
Schaff, Karl Korsch, Geörgy Lukács, Ernst Bloch, Roger Garaudy, Jürgen Habermas and 
Karel Kosík. We may include in critical Marxist theories also some more recent 
conceptions, as Jon Elster‟s „game theoretic Marxism‟, Gerald Cohen‟s Marxist 
functionalism, Mancur Olson‟s Marxist „theory of collective actions‟ of social classes,  
Harry Cleaver‟s, Taylor Lance‟s and John Holloway‟s „open Marxism‟ and Toni Negri‟s 
post-workerist Marxism. These critical Marxist theories reject a teleological view of social 
reality, refuse determinism and put particular emphasis on human essence and on living 
labour.  
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   Finally, let us mention two other highly controversial forms of Marxist 
humanism. One of them is the so-called „scientific‟ Marxist humanism, a 
form of anthropomorphic and non-philosophical naturalism, which rejected 
class struggle, in the name of a universal human inter-classist fellowship. 
The other one is Roger Garaudy‟s idealistic and transcendental kind of 
Marxist humanism, which in 1966 got the support of the Central 
Committee of the PCF, with the famous declaration that a Marxist humanist 
standpoint exists (“il y a un humanisme marxiste”). This position was not 
shared by Althusser, for whom there could not be much space for a 
theoretical humanism, as he conceived the historical process as governed 
by a structural causality of strict material nature.  
   As regards Italy, we may recall the Marxist scientific humanism of 
Galvano Della Volpe and neo-critical rationalist humanism of Ludovico 
Geymonat, both of which imply a creative anthropological conception (a 
philosophy of class emancipation and social revolution, but no theory of 
individual subject). They further entail a dialectical materialist view of the 
world, which culminates in the Marxian criticism of classical political 
economy, with its faith in the existence of natural and eternal economic 
laws.  
   Two other conceptions of neo-Marxist humanism worth to be mentioned 
are the historical realistic humanism of Enlightenment lineage of Antonio 
Banfi, Cesare Luporini and Giulio Preti, founded on the concept of „praxis‟ 
(acting for necessity) and open to the values of positive humanism; and the 
ethical and „non-economistic‟ humanism of a critical Marxist economist, 
Claudio Napoleoni, on which we shall turn more extensively in a while. 
    
    
3.  Religious and non-religious humanism. 
 
   Religion, a search for ethical values which provides a global view of life 
and afterlife, is not a natural exigency of all human minds. But it is a useful 
element for social integration, because it acts as a moral deterrent and 
offers human beings a possible delayed gratification for their good actions.  
   Religious humanism acknowledges the sacredness of human life. It 
recognizes in the human person a divine creation and a possible imago 
Dei5. And it rejects irrationalism and pragmatism. Though it does not 
conceive humanism as a conceptual alternative to capitalism, it regards 
                                                     
   5 This is however a rather controversial point, which, according to some interpretations, 
concerns human beings only before the alleged original sin and after the redemption of 
mankind.  
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humanism with favour, as something which could fill the lack of solidarity 
values of the capitalist system and could therefore contribute to humanize a 
market economy . 
   Christian faith is a specific form of religious humanism, implying a 
dogmatic belief in a set of exceptional events, such as the three in one 
nature of God, the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, the human 
incarnation of God‟s son, his sacrifice for the redemption of mankind by an 
original sin, his crucifixion and his later resurrection.  
   In the Christian faith in the human incarnation of Jesus Christ an 
important conception may be recognized: that of the infinity which 
becomes finiteness. With the incarnation of Christ, divinity takes human 
form. There is an evident change of perspective, in a laic direction. 
Transcendence turns into history. 
   Among various modern instances of Christian religious humanism, we 
may mention those provided by the existentialist philosophers Sȍren 
Kierkegaard and Karl Jaspers; by neo-Thomism, a neo-scholastic 
theological doctrine which aims at reconciling nature and grace; by a 
„personalist‟ catholic movement which translates faith into an active social 
practice of evangelization and ecumenical life (C. Renouvier, É. Boutroux); 
by the “Nouvelle Théologie” of the Lion Jesuitic school (H. De Lubac, J. 
Daniélou), which does not trace a net distinction between religion and 
reason6; and by the „new theologies of liberation‟, an outcome of the 
„anthropological turning‟ of Vatican II.  
   All forms of religious humanism aim at making the economy more 
human, by contrasting the excesses of the technological society, which 
dissolves many positive spiritual values. Some of them are practiced by 
French and Italian scholars7.  
                                                     
   6 The “Nouvelle Théologie” shares the critical realism of the Thomistic and the Dominican 
gnoseological systems of thought and the idea of a natural order and of an uncorrupted 
human being. It differs from the monastic spiritualism of other religious orders (the 
Augustinians, the Franciscans) which have a cosmocentric rather than an anthropocentric 
view of the world and take for granted the irreconcilability of nature and grace and the 
necessity of the latter for the salvation of mankind. 
   7 As concerns France, let us mention Jacques Maritain (the neo-Thomist author of 
Humanisme intégral and the deviser of the “city of man”), the medievalist Etienne Gilson 
(another neo-Thomist, who introduced the concept of philosophia christiana), Emmanuel 
Mounier (the founder of the „social personalism‟ or „relational humanisme‟ movement, 
which opposes individualism, and of the journal Esprit), Pierre Theilhard de Chardin (a 
Jesuit, upholder of an evolutionist cosmological conception) and Maurice Blondel (a 
pragmatist philosopher and a leading exponent of the modernist branch of laic theology 
which refutes metaphysics and includes faith in the sphere of irrational and supernatural). 
The ideas of these authors were initially seen with suspect by the Church (see Pius XII‟s 
1950 encyclical Humani generis). Three important Italian exponents of the neo-Scholastic 
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   The non-religious kind of humanism, on the other hand, may be 
considered the modern expression of a laic, philanthropic and anti-
authoritarian philosophy of immanence and finiteness, practiced by 
Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau, J.S. Mill and Comte. It rejects all 
metaphysics of absoluteness, acknowledges a natural primacy of human 
beings and derives its moral laws from reason and science, rather than from 
a religious faith. It proceeds from the bottom to the top, not by revelation, 
but by observation and introspection, and implies freedom of choice and 
human responsibility. It sets reason against faith, counters nature to grace, 
opposes natural right to Christian morality. As a positive and ethical 
„religion of humanity‟ (Mill, Comte), it takes science as the only reliable 
source of knowledge, refuses the idea of supernatural religious experiences, 
such as miracles, and denies the existence of sacramental opportunities of 
salvation.  
   Both religious and non-religious humanism try to reconnect human 
essence and human existence. That is necessity and freedom. But they do 
not agree on the logical priority of these concepts. Positive humanists 
conceive reality as action and place existence before essence. Religious 
humanists do the contrary. They meet a logical limit in the idea of a natural 
insufficiency of human reason. 
   These kinds of humanism conceive the social history of man as a history 
of salvation. Though salvation from different things. One of them from an 
alleged original sin, which configures a culpable past and a redeeming 
future. The other one from the dominance conditions imposed on human 
beings by authoritarian regimes, or by capital, in its unceasing pursuit of an 
increase in value. This is an unnatural goal. Economic activity was not 
originated by the search for profit, but by the need to satisfy the natural 
instinct of human preservation, the only general regulative principle of 
economic activity that may be found in primitive communities8.  
 
                                                                                                                          
theoretical school have been Bontadini, Pareyson and Del Noce. Gustavo Bontadini, who 
thought at the Catholic University of Milan, proposed a non-dogmatic synthesis of idealism 
and neo-Thomism, which aimed at reinterpreting classical metaphysics in Christian terms 
and at validating the intuitions of faith by the force of reason. Luigi Pareyson, who thought 
at the University of Turin, had a spiritualist view of existentialism. Augusto Del Noce‟s 
original conception of humanism combined Augustinian and Thomistic elements. 
   8 The typical figures of pre-capitalistic societies – the shepherd, the peasant, the 
handicraftsman – did not exhibit an acquisitive mentality. They did not work to get a profit 
and to accumulate wealth, but to obtain the necessaries for life. They were content to live 
with very little and were therefore in consonance with themselves. 
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4. Post-modern anti-humanism.  
 
   In the cultural history of human society the modern period is generally 
taken to denote in Western countries an age of scientific and economic 
progress, political emancipation and extended individual freedom, in which 
human beings rediscovered their subjectivity and were gradually liberated 
from prejudice and superstition. 
   In the modern age we may distinguish two sub-periods with distinct 
characteristics. They are sometimes referred as „early‟ and „late‟ 
modernism. In economics, early modernism was an age of scientific 
rationality. It began with classical political economy and included 
utilitarianism, positivism and the marginalist revolution. Economics came 
to be considered a scientific discipline: at first the classical analysis of 
formation, distribution and use of social product during the various stages 
of development of human society; later on, the theory of choice of how to 
use scarce means to achieve given ends. 
   The modernist trend was not confronted in economics with an easy task. 
It had to overthrow the lasting dominance of the „received view‟, a 
traditional mix of positivism, operationalism and scientism, entailing the 
assumption of full rationality of economic agents and absolute faith in 
scientific and economic progress. It brought the substitution of a rigid 
principle of causality with the idea of functional interdependence. And a 
legitimating view of the capitalist society.  
   Late-modernism was in economics a phase of historical transition. It saw 
important changes in the previous roles of capital and labour, together with 
the decline of industrial capitalism and of neoclassical theories based on 
rationality and equilibrium. It witnessed the rise of Keynesism and of a 
variety of post-Keynesian macroeconomic equilibrium and disequilibrium 
approaches. But it did not succeed in providing a widely accepted 
theoretical paradigm for economic explanation and prediction. And a new 
comprehensive vision of the working of the capitalist economy did not 
emerge9.   
   In the philosophy of science, late modernism brought a significant parting 
from utilitarianism and from methodological individualism, together with 
the decay of the neo-positivistic idea of the existence of objective 
                                                     
   9 As noticed by two careful observers, Arnold Gehlen and Jürgen Habermas, modernity 
remained in some sense an unfinished project, an incompletely realized innovative model of 
life. Half the mankind did not benefit of it. 
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knowledge and the rise of critical rationalism and of Karl Popper‟s 
methodology of empirical falsificationism10. 
   The post-modern age, which started in the late 1970s, was a disordered 
reaction to modernism. It was several things at once: a departure from 
ideologisms, an eclectic and non-systemic cultural age characterized by 
epistemic relativism and a nihilistic view of the world, and an anti-
methodologist, anti-humanist and anti-historicist approach. Human beings 
ceased to be regarded as active and conscious protagonists of history and 
began to be seen as the results of underlying physical and psychical 
structures11.  
   According to a well known definition given by a literary critic, Fredric 
Jameson, post-modernism was the dominant cultural logic of the late-
capitalist age of multinational capital, information technology and artificial 
intelligence. It rejected the identification of rational behaviour with the 
pursuit of self-interest maximization, acknowledged the existence of a 
number of heuristic and predictive paradigms, denied the applicability of 
objective criteria of knowledge, pointed out the importance of multiplicity 
and uncertainty and recognized complexity and propositional un-
decidability.  
   Critics of post-modernism took its epistemic relativism and its refusal of 
any ideology as implying theoretical and practical disengagement. And 
some of them dismissed post-modernism as a fashionable nonsense, a 
pseudo-intellectual celebration of incoherence, which went far beyond 
normal people‟s comprehension. 
   Many post-modern thinkers were anti-humanist. They opposed any 
humanist philosophy of the subject. The German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger, formerly an existentialist, after his post-war „turning‟ in the 
direction of the refusal of a human society entirely dominated by 
technology, rejected humanism, which he considered an ideology, a 
metaphysics of man12. And in his 1946 Letter on Humanism he denounced 
the ontological identification by humanists of being and existing.  
                                                     
   10 According to Milton Friedman‟s Methodology of Positive Economics (1953), the 
significance of any economic theory had to be appraised on the basis of the realism of its 
predictions, and not of its assumptions. The idea that an argument based on true premises 
may ultimately lead to false conclusions was regarded by some critics as a reductionist 
position. 
   11 Something similar had already happened in the ancient times of Leucippus, Democritus 
and Epicurus, who many centuries before the Christian era discovered the atomistic nature 
of the material structure of the world, only by reasoning, without disposing of a microscope. 
   12 By humanism (humanismus) Heidegger meant an endeavour to allow human beings to 
become “free for their humanity” and to find in this their value. 
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   Louis Althusser, a critical Marxist, did not consider Marxism a form of 
humanism, in spite of its emphasis on human alienation, and regarded 
Marxist humanism as a form of revisionism and Feuerbach‟s positive 
conception of humanism as „absolute anthropologism‟, or absolute 
materialism of man13. His theory of “aleatory materialism” – proposed in 
the 1980s, a dramatic and psychologically unstable period of his life – was 
a tool to interpret the complex relational structure of a world which obeyed 
no definite rules14. But after a fortunate period in which the Althusserian 
philosophie à l„état pratique became intellectually fashionable, there was a 
fall of interest in it, when its anti-Hegelian bias and its dichotomous 
interpretation of Marx‟s theoretical work – the thesis of an alleged coupure 
épistémologique between the young and the elder Marx – were considered 
insufficiently motivated and too radical by an increasing number of 
Marxists. 
   Althusser‟s philosophy was based on a theory of knowledge that 
recognized a material structure to the finite world and on a theory of social 
history which refused subjectivism (regarded as a bourgeois philosophical 
conception)  and where the fundamental category of determination was 
chance. He denied the existence of universal laws of historical change and 
did not accept the vulgar-Marxist conception of an historical process 
exclusively governed by the structural dynamics of the economy. He 
acknowledged the existence of a reciprocal interaction between the 
economic structure and the relatively autonomous political and ideological 
superstructure. Recognizing that structure and superstructure exert a 
reciprocal but unequal action, he admitted the possibility of feedback 
effects of the superstructure on the economic structure. But he saw a 
“theoretical lacuna” in the Marxian treatment of their dialectical relation, 
because the Hegelian dialectic had been accepted by Marx in its “rational 
kernel”, but had been reversed in its “mystical shell”15.  
                                                     
   13 “Feuerbach replaces Hegel‟s absolute objective idealism with humanism or absolute 
anthropologism, and substitutes to the absolute idealism of the Idea an absolute materialism 
of man” (On Feuerbach).  
   14 The state of the world was taken by Althusser to be the casual expression of various 
interacting and synchronic atomistic forces. He thought that social history was moved by 
class conflict and had neither a definite subject nor a definite object. 
   15 Economic theory, for Althusser, was not an autonomous scientific subject, but a 
“subordinated region of the theory of history”, itself a part of the global theory of social 
totality. Yet Althusser was prepared to concede that the economic process, differently from 
the historical one, had a definite subject and a definite object, expressed by structural and 
impersonal economic functions. Althusser did not believe in Hegel‟s dialectic of 
contradiction. He wanted to come back to Spinoza‟s materialist ontology, a non-dialectical 
philosophy of the constitution of political practice. He was a declared antagonist of the 
French historical school of “Les Annales” and refused Braudel‟s paradigm of an histoire 
 12 
 
   An anti-humanist position was taken also by Michel Foucault, the author 
of a manifest departure from the conventional „economic man‟ 
interpretation of human subjectivity. But in his micro-analysis of social 
structure, which stressed the importance of unconscious and irrationality, 
he did not abandon an anthropocentric perspective. In his “archaeology of 
knowledge” he denounced the dangers of „bio-politics‟ and the massive 
presence of repressive power and social exclusion in capitalist societies.  
   Foucault‟s peculiar position influenced two post-modern philosophers: 
Jacques Derrida, the father of deconstructionism16, and Paul Feyerabend, 
whose anarchist hermeneutics of “anything goes” denied the existence of 
absolute and permanent truths17.  
   Since then, much has been deconstructed, or overturned, in the field of 
economic and social sciences. But little was done to reconstruct a 
sufficiently unitary system of knowledge18.  
    
 
5. Economics, structuralism and psychologism.  
 
                                                                                                                          
matérielle de la longue durée. He thought that the end of capitalism and the advent of 
communism predicted by Marx should not be conceived as historical necessities originated 
by the internal contradictions of the capitalist system, but as simple uncertain and fortuitous 
possibilities. But no strategic political perspective was implied in his conception of the 
world. In 1972, in the course of a famous self-criticism, he reversed his previous position on 
the controversial question of Marxist humanism and on the theory of theoretical praxis and 
denounced it as a „theorist deviation‟ (Éléments d‟autocritique, Paris, 1974). 
   16 Derrida was a critic of logo-centrism, that is of the privileging of speeches over 
writings, and particularly of speeches with binary pairs in opposition. His deconstructionism 
is a technique for multiple competing interpretations of a text. It results from a combination 
of an outdated disciplinary system, whose basic rules have come in contradiction with their 
own structural logic and need to be destroyed, and the new structural system of knowledge 
which has to be constructed. 
   17 As a result there was a gradual shift of philosophical and theoretical economic emphasis 
from a context of systematic order and structural stability to a different one of permanent 
disequilibrium and creative destruction. This was a significant change of perspective which 
favoured a dismissal of methodological certainties and opened the way to a rather 
contradictory paradoxical mix of theoretical structuralism and practical humanism. 
   18 Some endeavours made in this direction, though questionable, may however be worth 
mentioning. Two of these are G. Duménil‟s and D.K. Foley‟s „new solution‟ to the Marxian 
„transformation problem‟ and  the re-interpretation of the Marxian theory of value as a 
„single‟ system, made by A. Kliman and others. Another neo-Marxist endeavour is the „post-
structuralist Marxian theory‟ of Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff, editors of the 
journal “Rethinking Marxism”. It is an anti-humanist theory of the generation, appropriation 
and class distribution of the social surplus, where humanism is regarded as a moralistic 
bourgeois phenomenon, offering an ideological covering to privilege and exploitation. 
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   Any intellectual or philosophical system presupposes the presence of a 
reference centre. Religion posits the existence of God, humanism that of the 
human being, structuralism that of underlying material structures. 
Psychoanalysis the presence of an underlying psychical structure: es, the 
unconscious. 
   An interesting  point in the history of philosophical anthropology, which 
can help to clarify the relations between economics, humanism and 
religion, may be evocated by recalling a debate between structuralists and 
psychologists on the logical primacy of either the material structure of the 
natural world or of the subjective conscience of man. For Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysts subjectivity comes first and does not exhaust 
itself in individual self-consciousness. The ego is conceived as a product of 
the unconscious, a psychical structure.  
   The influence of this debate on the recent history economic science may 
be appraised by considering some post-structural views on the nature this 
science. We may start by the political economy of sign and symbolic values 
of Jacques Baudrillard, which provides a naturalistic criticism of the 
semiotic nature of commodities in mature capitalism. Super-structural 
elements – as advertising, marketing and commodity value forms – are 
present in an important position and virtual entities, images and 
representations replace material production. As a consequence, human 
subjects lose contact with reality. In this post-modern context, consumption 
goods are no longer linked to specific functions or needs, but become 
symbols of impulses and desires (of wealth, power and social prestige). 
And firms have an obvious interest to arise specific needs, by mass 
advertising which plunge individuals in a „mediatic‟ bath, to satisfy them.  
   People rely on models and symbols, they live in a virtual world, a cyber-
space filled of hyper-realities: the world of TVs and computers, which 
capture people with their images. The outcome is an increasing gap 
between the sign, a void structural form, and reality, its empirical content. 
That is between the signifier and the signified19. 
   Other criticisms of classical anthropocentric humanism were made by 
Claude Levy-Strauss (la pensée sauvage) and by Georges Bataille, an 
advocate of a natural economy and a critic of the logic of business, based 
on the unnatural search for profit (la rage puritaine des affaires). They 
regarded as unnatural the categorical imperatives of the capitalist society, 
                                                     
    19 The distinction between the signifier and the signified expresses in structural linguistics 
a binary conception of sign (M. Merleau-Ponty). Signifiers are signs, the structural forms, 
which in political economy correspond to value forms. Signified are the real contents of the 
discourse, including the commodity forms. But the sign may be also seen as unity of  
signifier and signified, of formal expression and real content.  
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which force everybody to work, to consume and to save, in a non-
transgressive “restricted economy” (Bataille) exclusively oriented to the 
search of utility and productivity. 
   The awareness of the acquired pre-eminence of symbolic values20 over 
reality induced Baudrillard to deny a primacy of economics and to forecast 
the end of the age of organized production. And thus also the end of 
political economy, the science which explains that social reality and which 
has little to do with the valorization of signs. As a result, the superstructure, 
a simulation of reality, dominates the economic structure, the basis of 
reality. Just the opposite of what is postulated by the Marxist orthodoxy.  
   Jacques Derrida, a post-structuralist critic of conventional 
psychoanalysis, proposed a hermeneutical methodology of textual 
deconstruction and fragmentation. A linguistic methodology which implies 
a reject of the traditional logo-centrism, that is of the privileging of 
speeches over writings, motivated by the fact that speeches are necessarily 
associated with the speaker‟s presence, whereas writing is not. Thus the 
dominant “logo-centric metaphysics of the presence” should be rejected.  
   Another leading exponent of post-structuralism, Jean-François Lyotard, a 
critical Marxist, used to speak of “libidinal economics”, an expression with 
an evident Freudian reminiscence. „Libido‟ is the psychical energy of the 
sexual instinct required to perpetuate the human species. Lyotard thought 
that all structures contain a libidinal energy waiting to be released and 
transferred to other structures and that political economy is libidinal (toute 
économie politique est libidinale) because is charged with passions and 
subject to value judgments. He conceived post-modernism as a reaction to 
the grand historical meta-narratives of modernity and as an endeavour to 
build a new morality21. 
   A further post-structural philosophical conception which dealt with 
unconscious impulses, feelings and desires, and with their instinctual 
satisfaction, was that of Wilhelm Reich, an Austrian psychoanalyst and a 
leader in the fight against political repression and for sexual liberation. It 
was based on the. By extending the Freudian concept of libido (conceived 
                                                     
   20 Baudrillard‟s symbolic values include advertising, which reifies desire and pleasure, 
and the death principle which characterizes Sigmund Freud‟s “psychical economy”. See 
Freud‟s The Economic Problem of Masochism, 1924, where the death impulse – the „nirvana 
principle‟, that refers to a state of salvation in which any pain ceases – is contrasted to the 
hedonistic principle of pleasure (a libido, which may be appeased by satisfying the need). 
On this point, see also another work of Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
   21 Lyotard‟s libidinal economics was regarded by another critical Marxist, Alain Badiou, 
as being not a mix of Marx‟s conscious and Freud‟s unconscious dimensions of human 
existence, but as an unfortunate mix of French post-structuralist Maoism and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. 
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as a primordial cosmic energy, and renamed “orgone”) from individuals to 
society, Reich coined the notion of „sexual economy‟ and studied the 
biological and psychological mechanisms by which sublimation and 
repression of the libidinal impulses of sensual experience produce and 
maintain the political economy of capitalism22.  
   A variant of Lyotard‟s libidinal economics may be considered Gilles 
Deleuze‟s and Félix Guattari‟s “schizo-analysis of desiring production”, 
made in the context of their unsystematic and non-dialectical philosophy of 
difference and repetition. For them – a philosopher and a psychoanalyst – 
men are “desiring machines” (L‟Anti-Oedipe). Desire, a real productive 
force which moves the world economy, is the foundation stone of a theory 
of spending („sex sells‟) and two specific elements of desire, sex and 
money, are regarded as the basic structural ingredients of the schizophrenic 
capitalist modes of reproduction. 
   An atypical post-structuralist was Pierre Bourdieu, a radical leftist 
philosopher, anthropologist and sociologist, and a critic of modernism, 
utilitarianism and rational choice theory, who used to define himself a 
“constructivist structuralist”. He analyzed a virtual “economy of symbolic 
goods”, where imaginary commodities prevail over real ones.  
   Let us mention also Zygmunt Bauman‟s “political economy of 
uncertainty”, devised to put an end to the deregulation imposed by capital, 
business and finance to local political authorities23.  
   According to these authors, economic activity has much to do with the 
mental mechanisms which regulate the projection, inhibition and repression 
of mankind‟s impulses. They maintain that there is a phase of human life in 
which primitive unconscious psychological processes are substituted by 
more organized and unified processes and that it is in that phase that 
economic activity comes to the forefront.  
   Times had changed in an anti-fundamentalist direction which rejected 
formalism and determinism. Structuralism came to be regarded as an 
outdated methodology and scientific practice24. Even Marxist structuralism 
experienced a phase of rapid decadence.  
                                                     
   22 A socialist thinker, persecuted for his ideas, Reich spoke of a “sex-economic 
revolution”. He was one of the first scholars who tried to reconcile psychoanalysis and 
Marxism, by abandoning a dialectical materialist interpretation of the economic and social 
reality. He thought that there is an evident nexus between social repression of sexual desires 
and authoritarian logic of power. 
   23 For Bauman, a post-modernist scholar, deregulation stimulates business flexibility and 
speculative activities. But it makes politicians powerless and generates in the layman a sense 
of insecurity and a lack of confidence in the future. 
   24 An anti-humanist structuralism can be ascribed to the philosophers L. Althusser, E. 
Balibar and H. Lefebvre, the Freudian psychoanalyst J. Lacan, the semiologist and literary 
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  They were gradually overcome by post-structuralism, an anti-humanist 
and anti-historicist intellectual movement which aimed at re-establishing a 
primacy of the object of knowledge over the subject. It wanted to do this by 
a genetic analysis accounting for discontinuous and largely unpredictable 
structural changes, which would prevent any possibility to predetermine 
individual and social behaviour and to construct a general theory25. 
  
 
6. On the philosophical anthropology of “La Rivista 
Trimestrale”. 
 
   A dislike for today hyper-technocratic affluent and consumerist societies 
is shared by laic and religious humanism, both of which are critical of „wild 
capitalism‟, an economic system which sets off brutal and unregulated 
market forces. They distrust the systematic tendency of capitalism to 
accumulate wealth and to disregard distributive equity.   
   Emblematic in this regard may be considered the case of “La Rivista 
Trimestrale”, a quarterly cultural journal edited in Rome in the 1960s by 
two catholic and communist intellectuals, Claudio Napoleoni and Franco 
Rodano. The editors of the journal wished to reconsider the role of politics 
in the Italian social reality of that period. Their purpose was a twofold one: 
to make a critical revision of the rigidly deterministic schemes of dialectical 
materialism and to re-examine in the light of the original Christian message 
of the Gospel (Christianity sine glossa) the „established‟ doctrine of the 
Roman Church26. 
                                                                                                                          
critic R. Barthes, the anthropologists C. Lévi-Strauss and M. Godelier, and others. In 
economics a non-humanist structuralist or post-structuralist tendency is less evident. F. 
Quesnay‟s Tableau économique, K. Marx‟s reproduction schemes and W. Leontief‟s input-
output or inter-industry analysis – ante litteram examples of structural analysis in which the 
economic system consists of a set of interdependent productive sectors linked together by 
structural relations – are neither humanist nor anti-humanist. And so are some recent 
theoretical approaches which pay a particular attention to the structural features of the 
economy, such as those of Sraffa and Pasinetti.  
    25  Another differential feature between structuralism and post-structuralism is worth 
noting. Structuralism was a method of search which took economic and social structures as 
given realities, already formed and designed to perform specific functions. Post-
structuralism, on the contrary, paid attention to the origins of the modes of production and to 
the causes of their incessant historical evolution. It rejected essentialism and 
fundamentalism and allowed for the existence of residual autonomous spaces. It did not 
conceive the economic structure as a totalizing entity which flattened the role of human 
subjects. 
   26 Kierkegaard‟s “established” and “wordly” Christianity, which pertains to the temporal 
order.  
 17 
 
   The publication of the journal started in 1962, in the uncertain political 
climate of the first Italian experiences of a center-left government, by 
initiative of a small group of intellectuals, after a long period of preparatory 
meetings
27
. Financial support was provided by Raffaele Mattioli,  a man of 
letters and a friend of Rodano, chairman of an important Italian Bank. 
   In spite of its rather inexpressive title, the “Rivista Trimestrale” was not a 
mere container inspired by methodological pluralism and open to any 
contribution. It was a cultural magazine which dealt with some of the basic 
themes of our epoch: the uncertain and problematic nature of the human 
condition, the catholic question, the support of laicism, the internal 
contradictions of historical capitalism and the fight for the emancipation of 
human beings from the dominance of capital. The purpose of the editors 
was to build a cultural and political platform for a New Left. One based on 
a neo-Ricardian criticism of Marxism. 
   The editorial line of the journal was that of a positive humanism. It aimed 
at reaffirming the intrinsic nature of human subjectivity and the social 
character of labour.  
   Among the themes treated in the journal there were those typical of the 
left-wing catholic reflection: the relation of Catholicism with communism, 
the theoretical difficulties of scientific Marxism due to the abandonment of 
the „pure‟ labour theory of value and the ways to overcome the „negativity 
of finiteness‟. 
   The ambitious purpose of the editors was to found a new philosophical 
anthropology: a laic and humanist one, of Marxian and catholic lineage, 
with structural and historical connotations. As such, it had to be distant 
both from the „workerist‟ movement, which tried to give a political outlet 
in Italy to wage claims, and from the revolutionary ideology of the 
autonomous leftist groups committed to start a season of great social 
struggles.  
   There was in the journal an explicit refusal of the post-industrial capitalist 
society where people are forced to work hard only to be able to consume 
more. An unsocial society, which does not provide everybody with a job 
and an income. And there was also another refusal: that of a „neutral‟ 
economic science, free from value judgments.  
   Rodano and Napoleoni were both communist and catholic. They looked 
at communism as a great philosophical and ethical instance of 
transformation: the project of a different mode of staying in the world, in 
accordance with a natural scale of values. They had a sense of cosmic 
religiousness which perceived a substantial identity of God and Nature. 
                                                     
   27 On this point, see M. Mustè, 1993, pp. 119-51. 
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And they regarded the Christian faith as a great spiritual force, 
philanthropic and humanitarian, whose value may be recognized even by 
unbelievers.  
   They did not want to oppose man and God, but their search for truth 
started from the human being. It was not a theocratic philosophical 
conception, but an anthropocentric one, grounded on solidarity and equality 
principles. They regarded the human essence as a non predetermined entity: 
a multidimensional reality open to any type of creative development. 
   Their ethic was laic and based on deep respect for those moral values 
which were founded on the very nature of man and on the social obligations 
suggested by reason and experience. From this point of view, their ethical 
vision might recall the neo-Kantian kind of socialism and the neo-criticist 
philosophy of values of the Marburg school, which was more similar to 
Protagora‟s skepticism and moral relativism than to Plato‟s ethical 
absolutism28.  
   In 1962 Napoleoni was 38 years old. He was engaged in cultural and 
political activities, but was not yet a university professor and a  member of 
the Italian Parliament. After an active political militancy of eight years in 
the Communist Party, he had edited an innovative Dictionary of Political 
Economy and was the headmaster in Rome of a post-graduate school on the 
theory and policy of economic development29. 
   Rodano was 42 years old. In his young years, he had attended a Jesuitic 
college and got a Thomistic culture.  Formerly a member of the Catholic 
Action movement, he had taken an active part in the Italian Resistance to 
fascism, as member of a small underground group of catholic communists, 
who later converged in a Christian leftist party. After the liberation of Italy, 
Rodano had an intense political activity and wrote on various newspapers, 
including the Vatican daily L‟Osservatore Romano. In 1947, when he was 
27, he was excommunicated ad personam by the Holy Office for his 
communist ideology, a measure (later disavowed by Pope John XXII) 
                                                     
   28 Napoleoni‟s ethic was closer to the classical ethic of ends and ideals than to the 
utilitarian ethic of motivations and desires, which inspired philosophical radicalism and 
liberalism. But he did not consider them two different languages, for he did not regard a 
sense of humanity and the power of reason as separable. 
   29 Later on, Napoleoni published other important works, such as Il pensiero economico del 
„900 (1961), L‟equilibrio economico generale (1965), Smith, Ricardo, Marx (1970), Lezioni 
sul capitolo sesto inedito di Marx (1972), Il valore (1976), Discorso sull‟economia politica 
(1985) and, posthumous, Cercate ancora: lettera sulla laicità e ultimi scritti (1990, R. La 
Valle ed.) and Dalla scienza all‟utopia (1992, G.L. Vaccarino, ed). On Napoleoni, see the 
monographs by R. Bellofiore (1991) and the present writer (Cavalieri, 2006). 
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which did not induce him to abandon his catholic faith and his activity as a 
communist political columnist30. 
   The “Trimestrale” reaffirmed the centrality and autonomy of politics. 
Political activity was interpreted in its highest sense: as an opportunity of 
critical and disinterested search for truth and of civil comparison of 
different opinions, to get a democratic definition of social choices. The 
journal rejected any form of religious and political fundamentalism, 
denounced the repressive logic of the capitalist system and invited people 
to reconsider critically the performance of affluent societies.  
   The political aim of the journal was to build an ideal bridge between two 
different humanist conceptions of life: the catholic and the communist one. 
By so doing, the “Trimestrale” forestalled Berlinguer‟s political objective 
of realizing an “historic compromise”31. And it anticipated the 
governmental formula of “national solidarity”.  
 
 
7.  Humanism as an alternative to the ideology of capital. 
 
   Communism and humanism were for Napoleoni and Rodano an 
indissoluble binomial. In communism they saw an ethical plea for 
transforming the world in a humanist direction and for getting an 
equalitarian and participating form of social organization. In Christianity 
they recognized a great spiritual force, one which did not intend to offer an 
alternative to capitalism, or to the ruling ideology of capital, but was 
prepared to fill its lack of ethical values and to give its victims a 
consolatory hope, that of a further and better life. 
   Napoleoni and Rodano were not true Keynesians. They regarded 
Keynesian reformism as objectively functional to the dominance logic of 
capital. They thought that Keynesism was not ultimately aimed at 
overcoming the capitalistic system, but at making it more stable and more 
                                                     
    30  Rodano‟s most important articles are now collected in volumes: Sulla politica dei 
comunisti (1975), Questione democristiana e compromesso storico (1977), Il pensiero di 
Lenin: da ideologia a lezione (1980), Lettere dalla Valnerina (1986), Lezioni di una storia 
“possible” (1986, G. Tassani and V. Tranquilli, eds.), Lezioni su servo e signore: per una 
storia post-marxiana (1990, V. Tranquilli, ed.) and Cattolici e laicità della politica (1992, 
V. Tranquilli, ed.). On Rodano, see: A. Del Noce (1981) and M. Musté, 1993 and 2000. 
   31 “Historic compromise” was the name given in Italy to an innovative reformist political 
endeavour committing catholics, communists and socialists to renew their anti-fascist unity 
and to reconcile the market economy with the Welfare State. With no detriment for the laity 
of policy. The devised encounter of the Catholic and communist morals was however 
prematurely cut off by the murder of Aldo Moro and by the sudden death of Enrico 
Berlinguer. 
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democratic (more palatable). And they wished to avoid the risk of a social-
democratic or liberal drift of the Italian communist party.  
     Their purpose was to overthrow the capitalist system, which they 
regarded as basically inconsistent with democracy. In their opinion, the 
market economy was not democratic. It did not assign a right to vote to 
every person, but to every dollar a person could spend. But they did not 
propose to give up with the market, which they considered a useful social 
institution. While objecting to the market autonomy, they wanted to keep 
intact the market functionality and to reconcile its allocation mechanism 
with democratic planning. 
   Yet they intended to achieve this objective in different ways. Rodano 
cherished the radical perspective of a revolution, conceived as an 
ontological „drop in the absolute‟, whereas Napoleoni, who believed in the 
efficacy of policy, sponsored (but later abandoned) the idea of a structural 
reform of the economic system realized in the socially agreed framework of 
a democratic planning and a comprehensive incomes policy. He conceived 
the revolution only in the sense of a fight for recovering the „positiveness of 
finiteness‟ (that is, of human labour), undermined by capitalism. 
    They saw the natural solution of the Marxian „enigma of history‟ in a 
communist-and-Christian society, an utopian kingdom of liberty, free from 
any form of constriction. Including those resulting from religious 
superstitions and from the subordination of labour to capital, typical of a 
society where the capacity to work was everything and workers were 
nothing. They recognized in labour the substance of value, but rejected the 
Marxian version of the labour theory of value, which assumed a direct 
proportionality relation between labour values and the prices of production 
of commodities.  
   The “Trimestrale” acknowledged the difference between the medieval 
anthropological conception which identified the worker in the slave or serf 
figure and the present progressive vision of the problem, which recognizes 
equal natural rights and equal duties to all human beings, independently of 
their social position. 
   Napoleoni and Rodano were both attracted by ontology, the philosophical 
reflection on human essence. They wanted to free the subject from a 
subjectivist perspective and to reaffirm the ontological difference between 
the subject and the object. And, ultimately, to strengthen the positive 
meaning of human finiteness. In Napoleoni and Rodano there was possibly 
a mild propensity to an utopian way of thinking. But there was no trace of 
an escape from the daily reality and of the search for a comfortable shelter 
in metaphysics.  
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8.  A laic way to liberation.  
 
  The journal used to afford also some important theological problems. First 
of all, the question of the necessity of grace for salvation, which confronted 
humanity with a difficult dilemma, as human beings had either to submit to 
a divine will that imposed to renounce to be themselves and to pay for an 
alleged original sin, or to refuse to do this and to reaffirm their natural 
essence, saving their human dignity, but refusing the religion precepts. 
   As concerned the fundamental question of the essence or natural 
dimension of human beings, the choice was between the pragmatic 
Thomistic line which reconciled the omnipotence of God with the natural 
freedom of human beings, a line supported by the Dominicans and the 
Jesuits, and the Augustinian thesis of an uncorrupted pureness of the human 
nature, which persisted after and in spite of the original sin. For Napoleoni 
nature and grace, finiteness and infiniteness, reason and faith, could not be 
separated. He did not share what had been done in the 16
th
 century by the 
Molinist separatist movement, which tried to reconcile God‟s almightiness 
and the natural freedom of man by separating grace and nature.  
   Rodano was critical of the Thomistic line, to which he attributed an 
anthropocentric but rather conservative position, that had given a historical 
justification to servile work. Napoleoni was more indulgent. He regarded 
Thomism as a possible point of contact between the neo-Platonic Christian 
spiritualism, which places the fundamental spiritual needs before the results 
of science, and the Aristotelian naturalism and rationalism, which regards 
scientific and technical progress in a more positive perspective.  
   There were also other important reasons that induced Napoleoni to put an 
end in 1970 to his intellectual partnership with Rodano and to conclude 
eight years of common editorial experience in the “Rivista Trimestrale”32. 
One of them concerned the validity of the thesis that a capitalist society is 
necessarily founded on the exploitation of wage labour, concealed by a 
seemingly fair exchange relationship.  
   Napoleoni thought that in modern societies the main source of exchange 
value was not the productivity of labour, but that of capital. And that in a 
hypothetical „pure‟ capitalist economy, which would maximize the 
accumulation of capital and abstain from unproductive consumption, there 
would not be labour exploitation, though alienation would be general and 
                                                     
   32 They were recalled by Napoleoni in an article published in a communist journal, 
“Rinascita”, two years later (on October 6, 1972). 
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would affect both wage earners and capitalists. This opinion was not shared 
by Rodano. 
   A second reason of dissent was due to their different mental attitude 
towards work. For Rodano, human work was the expression of the 
negativity of finiteness, by which humanity could get out only by a 
revolution, intended as an ontological drop in the absolute. Whereas for 
Napoleoni this could only be true for wage-earning labour, for which the 
revolution had to be regarded as a re-appropriation of the lost subjectivity 
of labour. Independent work, for Napoleoni, was a kind of activity that  had 
in itself nothing of negative or alienating. 
   A third reason of dissent concerned the appropriateness of a reformist 
economic policy. On this point Napoleoni had changed his mind. Now he 
thought that reformism implied an acceptance of the fundamental values of 
the capitalist society. And that his previous intention to modify the resource 
allocation in the system by means of the usual tools of economic and 
financial policy, sponsored by the “Trimestrale”, was a dangerous reformist 
illusion and had to be abandoned33. He asked for a radical change of 
attitude in this regard. In his opinion, it was no longer possible to limit the 
policy measures to the domain of economic rent and unproductive 
consumption. Government intervention had to be made directly on the 
sphere of production activity, where the exploitation of wage labour and the 
split between work and needs which caused labour alienation had its origin.  
   A further reason of dissent, not mentioned by Napoleoni, was probably 
related with Rodano‟s idea that the political problem of defending the 
natural liberty of man could be afforded separately from the religious 
problem of God‟s grace. Napoleoni maintained that there could be no 
separation between nature and grace. He believed that man was created in 
God‟s grace. But he added that he did not know whether human 
subjectivity had to be regarded as the determination of the original essence 
of man, or as the result of a predetermined historical destiny. 
   Unfortunately, a parallel reconstruction made by Rodano of the reasons 
of their dissent is not available. He believed in a revolution as the only way 
to realize the natural essence of human beings. But he was not insensible to 
                                                     
   33 It should perhaps be added that Napoleoni believed that Rodano conceived value as a 
technical and natural relation, following Sraffa, who had argued that the production prices of 
commodities could be determined without any reference to labour values,. For Napoleoni, 
who in those years had definitely changed its mind on the relevance of Sraffa‟s 1960 book 
on Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, Sraffa had reduced to a mere 
equilibrium theoretical construction the theory of value, a historical and social relation based 
on the Marxian concept of abstract labour.   
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the medieval scholastic anthropology which regarded human work in a 
negative light, as a sacrifice required to expiate the original sin.  
   Napoleoni, who did not share this view, wished to recover the positive 
character of labour and thought that for this purpose it would not be 
sufficient to dismiss the pervasive cult of productivity and to adverse 
unnecessary consumption. It was necessary to get out the capitalist society. 
   It should be noticed that Napoleoni and Rodano were both in favour of a 
libertarian and humanitarian ethic of laic commitment and responsibility. 
As open-minded Christian communists, they respected positive atheism, a 
laic religion of immanence.  
   The laity of politics was a liberal achievement that both of them were 
prepared to defend. But Napoleoni did not want to emphasize it too much. 
He feared that as a reaction this attitude could promote religious 
fundamentalism and generate a climate which would prevent the attainment 
of their main objective: the devised political convergence of Catholics and 
communists34.  
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